American University Washington College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Kenneth Anderson

November 7, 2008

Q: Do International NGOs Have Too Much
Power?
Kenneth Anderson

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/kenneth_anderson/119/

Working Paper Draft of November 7, 2008
Book Chapter on Debates on Globalization and Global Governance

Q:
Do International NGOs Have Too Much Power?
Kenneth Anderson
NGOs can claim excessive power depending on what kind of power they exercise, or
hope to exercise, where that power is supposed to come from and in what capacity they
seek to use their power.
The Nobel Peace Prize Committee, in awarding the 1997 prize to Jody Williams and the
International Committee to Ban Landmines, put forth the proposition that NGOs are full
fledged members of international society, alongside states and public international
organizations:
[P]ublic opinion must be formed and directed by the active involvement of
individual members . . . in society’s manifold organizations or
associations. These are the fundamental institutional elements of what we
have learned to know as a civil society. . . . [I]n the extensive cooperation .
. . between . . . non-governmental organizations, . . . national governments,
and the international political system . . . we may be seeing the outline of .
. . a global civil society.
i

When international NGOs claim power and authority to join with international
organizations such as the UN on the grounds that they represent what the UN Charter
calls the “peoples of the world” and claim authority to act on their behalf, then indeed
they have too much power – or, at least, they claim power on the basis of a false premise.
If, on the other hand, they simply seek successfully to lobby international organizations
and governments speaking for themselves and not claiming to speak for anyone else, and
if they make their advocacy claims based on accurate and demonstrated evidence of
expertise and competence at what they do, then they merit close attention by actual
decision-makers in governments and international organizations. It depends on what
NGOs claim as the reason why anyone should listen to them, and on whether they claim
that their point of view should prevail simply because they are NGOs and somehow
“represent” the peoples of the world – whether the peoples of the world know it or not.
NGOs that are competent, expert, and knowledgeable in the way that good advocates
should be merit the not-insubstantial power that goes along with powerful advocacy – not
as a matter of right, but as a matter of persuasiveness.
From ‘International NGOs’ to ‘Global Civil Society’ via
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
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With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet empire in 1989, the weight of bipolar superpower struggle ended. A broad but loose American hegemony guaranteed the
security of the world’s industrialized democracies. NATO and the fall of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact meant that the United States had no external state enemies to
speak of. Saddam’s 1990 invasion and annexation of Kuwait, leading to the First Gulf
War, raised hopes among many “liberal internationalists” that a new era could be ushered
in – an era in which international law and institutions such as the UN could create “global
governance” that would overcome the anarchy of states and their power struggles with
some form, however loose, of binding law over states.
What do these geopolitical shifts among nation-states have to do with international
NGOs? The end of the Cold War persuaded many NGOs, particularly in areas of human
rights, the environment and the women’s movement, that the moment had come for
NGOs to claim their rightful part in globalization – and go global. This meant either or
both of two things: first, expanding activities, membership, organizational structures
across borders, so as to be genuinely cross-border organizations. Second, Western and
Northern-based NGOs that, during the Cold War, had not seen much point in engaging
with the UN during the frozen decades of bi-polar superpower struggle came to see the
UN as a fruitful, indeed rightful place to lobby, advocate, and organize.
Throughout the 1990s, international NGOs were taking part in, or else learning lessons
from, the transformative experience of NGOs of the early 1990s. The most
transformative of these was the international campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines,
which got underway initially as a grave concern of the ICRC in the 1980s as it saw
firsthand the humanitarian damage of landmines, mostly in civil wars. The campaign
took shape in the early 1990s as a loose coalition of leading international NGOs that
crossed disciplinary lines – human rights, humanitarianism, medical relief, development,
and others – and which came together as the network of the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL) and which, along with its director, Jody Williams, won the 1997
Nobel Peace Prize for the achievement of a comprehensive ban treaty, the Ottawa
Convention, which has attained wide ratification by states worldwide
The landmines ban campaign contains many lessons for international NGOs, but the one
that concerns us here is perhaps the most abstract and politically most ambitious. It is the
idea that international NGOs can be understood as more than simply skillful lobbyists
and advocates for causes which concern their organizations and memberships. Instead,
they can be understood as advocating on behalf of the citizens of the world. Moreover,
that international NGOs should be understood in the international community as a force
for ‘democratizing’ international politics by breaking down the state-centric nature of the
international system and its core assumption that states only deal with one another and
the international organizations that states themselves create, such as the UN, and not with
individual people or NGOs or citizens groups.
The landmines ban campaign, among many other things, challenged that state-centric
model and asserted that the international system would henceforth have to deal, if not
3
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1297443

precisely with individuals, then with organizations that would advocate their interests
before international bodies. International NGOs were to be understood as advocating on
behalf of individuals and populations directly, rather than states advocating on behalf of
their citizens. Hence, in virtue of this representation directly to international bodies,
international NGOs must therefore have a seat at the same table as states and
international organizations in making decisions, creating treaties and setting standards in
things ranging from human rights to international development to the content of
international law. The ban campaign had secured a place for NGOs alongside of states in
negotiating the Ottawa Convention – since the ICBL had been responsible for bringing it
about, it would have been unseemly, churlish even, for the negotiating meetings of states
to keep out the main promoter – and this was taken to establish a new precedent of
international NGO participation to speak on behalf of the world’s peoples. No longer a
claim merely to advise or advocate or lobby on the basis of an organization’s expertise
and competence in a particular area, the new claim was a breathtakingly sweeping one. It
was no less than a claim for a seat at the table of global governance for international
NGOs on the basis of speaking for the ‘peoples of the world’ – representation, in a word:
international NGOs, rather than governments, would speak for ‘people’.
The final version of the idea that emerged during the 80s and 90s was that civil society
was the space of social and political activity that was neither part of the state, nor part of
the market. It was the space of social life, sometimes political and sometimes not, where
human beings lived social lives that were ordered – and ordered about – by neither the
state nor the market. These social spaces made possible organized, civilized politics in a
liberal sense because they allowed a space for organizing, for discussion, for mediation of
social and political claims, outside of the impositions of state authority but also outside of
the economic inequalities and hierarchies imposed by the market.
However, critical concerns about the role of civil society in domestic societies were
raised. The proposition that international NGOs should be conceived as global civil
society was, therefore, a double assertion. First, it was the claim that global civil society,
analogous to domestic civil society, served as the organized response of citizens across
the globe, as intermediaries on behalf of the world’s peoples, and as representatives for
their sakes. But then, naturally – the organized response to whom, as intermediaries
before whom, and representatives to whom?
Second global civil society was claimed to act in those roles both ‘in front of’ and ‘in
partnership with’ international organizations like the UN. Regarding states, on the other
hand, the relationship was always one of equality, as equal pretenders in addressing
issues, on the one hand, and in addressing international organizations of global
governance, on the other. Global civil society might work with states in “partnership,” as
representatives of the people of the world, or it might work against them, insofar as
global civil society believed that states, or particular states, were not representing the
interests of the world’s peoples.
Theorists of global civil society took various positions on the exact relationships among
global civil society, states, international organizations, and the ‘international community’
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generally. But the core point was that global civil society saw itself as at least as
legitimate, if not more so, in proclaiming, advocating, and insisting that it was right in its
representation and intermediation on behalf of the peoples of the world, as the states that
otherwise purported to represent them. And if international organizations – like the UN –
wanted to have the legitimacy of a genuinely global constituency, they too would have to
accept partnership with global civil society.
What’s Wrong with the Conventional Account of Global Civil Society?
Given the undeniable attractions of greater transparency and visibility in the making of
global policy, whether by states together or through the UN, what could possibly be
wrong with this intellectual and ideological ratcheting up, in effect, of international
NGOs from mere observers, advocates, and advisors to the status of representatives?
What’s not to like?
The most obvious problems are with the claims, made with greater and greater
extravagance throughout the later 1990s, of the special status of global civil society to
serve as representatives and intermediaries. David Rieff put the blunt question in a sharp
intellectual challenge in 1999. “So who elected the NGOs?” he asked.ii It was a question
that increasing numbers of previously sympathetic observers began to ask following the
anti-globalization riots in Seattle in December 1999, when violent protests succeeded in
shutting down meetings of the World Trade Organization. The Seattle 1999 riots were
largely forgotten as the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars took over the central attention of global elites, but they inaugurated a
wave of skepticism about the inflation of ideological claims by international NGOs that
still echoes today. The riots, and the fact that so many supposedly “respectable” NGOs
that were considered to be desirable interlocutors of institutions such as the World Bank
and the UN stood aside from criticizing the violence in the streets, caused what might be
called the “responsible global business community” to question their support and to
wonder aloud who indeed, and how many people, these organizations actually
represented. Influential global establishment voices such as the Economist magazine or
the Financial Times had been favorable throughout the 90s to the landmines ban
campaign. Indeed, they had been favorable generally to the role played by NGOs and
had, in effect, endorsed the idea that a maturing global capital system would have global
civil society – which is to say, they had accepted uncritically the idea that global civil
society really was the analogue of civil society in a domestic democratic society.
Following Seattle, they began sharply to question the issue of representativeness.
Fareed Zakaria, then managing editor of Foreign Affair (to take a representative sample
of the skepticism), contacted ten NGOs after the Seattle riots and found that
“most consisted of ‘three people and a fax’.” He expressed the concern, widely echoed
among global elites outside of the NGOs and anti-globalization community, that the “rich
world will listen too much to the loud minority” of First World activists and “neglect the
fears of the silent majority” in the developing world who would benefit from activities
not considered virtuous by the elites of the developed world.iii The Economist ran a
series of stories with titles such as “NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries” and
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“Citizens Groups: The non-governmental order: Will NGOs democratize, or merely
disrupt, global governance?”iv These were not observers opposed ideologically to the
idea of either international NGOs or global governance, but the claims of
representativeness suddenly, after Seattle, appeared to be as dangerous as they were
unfounded. Journalist Sebastian Mallaby, in a famous – or infamous – article in Foreign
Policy and later a section of his book on the World Bank, recounted going to an NGO in
Uganda that had been widely touted by an American NGO based in Berkeley, the
International Rivers Network, as representing local opposition to a dam that would
otherwise bring electricity to a vast number of people: he went to the Uganda offices and
discovered, looking at the inscription record, that the NGO had a total of twenty five
members.v
Do NGOs wield too much power when they inflate themselves into global civil society,
representing supposedly vast populations with which, in fact, they have no real contact at
all? Yes. The claim of representation really amounts to a claim of being the legitimate
intermediaries for all these people, which in turn really amounts to a claim of knowing
what they want and what is best for them. One is entitled to be skeptical of the power
that NGOs claim. Can one really set aside their governments so easily, and set off the
complex tradeoffs that governments – even ones that are not especially transparent or
democratic – have to make in governing? It is one thing to criticize these governments
for not representing their peoples democratically - and fair enough. But the gap between
saying that international NGOs and their judgments should substitute for those
governments and their judgments is immense, even if you accept the limited or minimal
democratic legitimacy of those governments. Whatever one might correctly think about
those governments, thinking about NGOs and legitimacy is another matter entirely.
The claims to representativeness and intermediation are thus gravely suspect, and to the
extent that international NGOs rely upon them – rely upon them and so characterize
themselves as global civil society – they exercise, or seek to exercise, too much power.
Or, more precisely, they seek to exercise power from a source to which international
NGOs are not legitimately entitled. And the path of NGOs today has been one of
carefully hedged retreat, at least in public, from these claims of representativeness. Thus,
for example, the head of Greenpeace UK, Peter Melchett, stated in an interview not long
after the Seattle riots what might seem to be the obvious view:
“Democratic governments are elected and have democratic legitimacy.
Other organizations, such as Greenpeace, The Spectator and the Guardian,
do not. We have the legitimacy of our market of who buys us or supports
us. I don’t claim any greater legitimacy than that, nor do I want it.”vi
The self-abnegation and self-effacement are admirable – if only one could quite believe
it. Because the general experience of negotiations, discussions, drafting sessions, etc., at
international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and so
on, is that global civil society does indeed expect to be invited in and have a seat at the
table. It really does believe that it is in partnership, or at least ought to be. This is what it
learned from the landmines campaign, after all. The UN Charter recognizes a certain
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advisory and expert role for NGOs, but what is sought and claimed here goes far beyond
that. To claim a role not merely as an advocate representing one’s own organizational
point of view, buttressed by expertise respected by others but perhaps not, is really only
possible if NGOs believe, and expect others to believe, that they cannot be kept out of
these processes because they really are, even after all the skepticism, still ‘representative’
of the peoples of the world in a way that no one and nothing else is: not international
organizations, and certainly not states, not even democratic ones.
Moreover – and this is a point not sufficiently acknowledged in the debate – to the extent
that an NGO is granted access and status and legitimacy in virtue of being
‘representative’ of someone or something, its actual expertise, competence, and
accomplishment become correspondingly less relevant. The right of access is on account
of the claim of representation, not on the claim of relevant expertise. It dangerously
undercuts the idea that NGOs ought to know whereof they speak – and, because it
empowers the incompetent equally as the competent, makes it more difficult for the
objectively and genuinely competent NGOs to make their voices heard.
Yes, Too Powerful If …
Expertise and competence are not everything. In democratic societies, we elect people
who might indeed lack expertise and competence; consent of the governed, including in
those who rule them, wisely or unwisely, belongs to those same governed. Nor, for that
matter, would most of us want to be governed by technical experts alone; too many of the
questions that make up a politics cannot be settled on technical grounds alone, but
involve inevitably questions of values.
The problem is that even if governments lack all the legitimacy one might want, even if
they lack democratic legitimacy that is very, very far from a justified argument that
therefore global civil society can take over for them. Likewise with international
organizations that lack any real basis in democratic legitimacy. Expertise and
competence is not enough to get international NGOs the kind of authority within the
international system that they plainly believe – still believe – they merit.
In that sense – the sense of what international NGOs want in their self-proclaimed role as
global civil society – if given the opportunity NGOs will wield too much power, because
that is the power they believe they merit. Eventually the role of faux-representativeness
undermines such competence and expertise as the NGOs have, because over the long
term their incentives are changed. Yet this cannot be good for them or for those whom,
without claiming to represent them in the world, at their best they can and should serve.
The unpleasant burden upon states and international organizations, therefore, is to tell the
international NGOs ‘no’ when they overreach from claims of expertise to claims –
however covert, however much concealed, however much at odds with public
proclamations of NGO modesty – of representation of the peoples of the world. They do
not represent them; they represent themselves, and their power ought to be tied strictly to
that condition.
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